responsible communication and the PPPA provisions are not limited to "those in power" or to "press investigations." But it is also narrower in that it considers only defamation, not privacy.
Both mechanisms are useful tools for protecting speech on matters of public interest, but each has flaws, either inherently or that have developed through their application, that prevent them from better achieving their aims. Responsible communication, although flexible and broad in principle, has been narrowly applied. As a result, communication is found not to be responsible when it arguably is. In addition, the defence is being treated as applicable only to journalists, which is, in my view, a misreading of the Supreme Court of Canada's Grant decision. As a result, the potential of the responsible communication defence to protect speech on matters of public interest is not being met.
Ontario's PPPA has been successful in getting some SLAPP suits dismissed. However, the serious consequences of a successful PPPA motion mean that courts are sometimes interpreting its provisions unduly narrowly. In addition, it seems that proceedings are rarely dealt with expeditiously, diluting the advantage of the PPPA over a summary judgment motion, for example.
II. THE CANADIAN LEGAL LANDSCAPE

A. General
To understand Canada's attempts at achieving a better balance between protecting reputation and protecting speech on matters of public interest, it is necessary to consider how Canadian law differs from that in other jurisdictions. Canadian defamation law is almost exclusively civil (as opposed to criminal) 11 and is largely based on English common law. As such, defamation is considered primarily a private law wrong for which the appropriate remedy is damages and perhaps injunctive relief rather than criminal sanctions. This differentiates it from civil law jurisdictions in Europe and elsewhere. 12 Other than Quebec, each province and territory (defamation law being a matter of provincial law) has its own libel and slander statute, 13 but the statutes are not complete codes. Rather, they tend to override or clarify the common law on matters such as limitations periods and specifying certain privileged occasions. 14 There is enough similarity between provinces and territories, however, that I refer throughout this article to Canadian defamation law. (Quebec law is civil rather than common law and is not discussed further).
Whereas U.S. defamation law is subject to the 1st Amendment, the Canadian common law of defamation law is not subject to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms' protection of freedom of expression. 15 This is because the common law is not considered government action. 16 That said, the common law must evolve in order to reflect Charter values, including freedom of expression.
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Recent defendant-friendly changes to the law have been justified on the grounds of compliance with Charter values. 18 Canadian defamation law, however, remains plaintiff-friendly. Plaintiffs need only establish the three traditional defamation elements: that the statement was about the plaintiff; that it was published to a third party; and that the statement was such as to make an ordinary person think less of the plaintiff. 19 As discussed below, there is no public figure doctrine. The elements are often straightforwardly made out. Instead, cases tend to turn on defences, for which the defendant has the onus of proof. These include truth, qualified and absolute privilege, fair comment, and responsible communication. 20 Falsity is presumed. This onus means that even those with a valid defence may lose or may have to settle because they lack resources to litigate. Damages are presumed from a finding of liability and are at large.
21
There is no cap on general damages, 22 and average damages awards were recently found to be about $60,000 Canadian 23 (about U.S. $48,000 at the time of writing), although the median was much lower. 24 Litigating is, of course, also quite costly. The significant economic consequences of defamation can therefore create a chilling effect on speech, either before speaking or afterwards, in terms of retractions. 25 Further, in Canada, as in the United Kingdom, losing parties are generally required to pay a significant portion of the successful parties' costs. 26 Although this disincentivizes frivolous lawsuits, it also increases parties' risk, and therefore presumably increases the chilling effect.
B. Laws Protecting Speech on Matters of Public Interest
Like most jurisdictions, Canada has rejected the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (Sullivan) absolute malice rule. That is, Canada has no public figure doctrine comparable to that in the U.S., where public figure plaintiffs can only succeed in defamation by showing the defendant published with knowledge that the statement was false or was recklessness as to falsity. 27 Instead, Canadian law tends to provide additional protection for speech on matters of public interest. In other words, it provides favourable treatment based on the subject matter of the communication rather than on the kind of plaintiff. 21 . "It has long been held that general damages in defamation cases are presumed from the very publication of the false statement and are awarded at large." Hill, [1995] 2 S.C.R., para. 164 The law protects speech on matters of public interest through the common law defamation defences of fair comment and responsible communication, and through Ontario's PPPA motion to dismiss. Fair comment protects statements of opinion that relate to matters of public interest if they could be held by anyone given the underlying facts and if they were not malicious. 28 It is a well-established defamation defence and it is not discussed further.
While fair comment protects opinion, until 2009, there was no defence for fair factual statements on matters of public interest. As a result, unless qualified or absolute privilege applied, defendants had to prove the truth of factual allegations in order to successfully defend a defamation action. This often proved difficult, even if the statement was, in fact, true. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Grant:
A journalist who has checked sources and is satisfied that a statement is substantially true may nevertheless have difficulty proving this in court, perhaps years after the event. The practical result of the gap between responsible verification and the ability to prove truth in a court of law on some date far in the future, is that the defence of justification is often of little utility to journalists and those who publish their stories.
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Although any defendant may have difficulty proving truth years after the fact, the law was thought to be especially harsh for journalists. First, journalism raises special evidentiary difficulties in that it sometimes relies on sources with whom a journalist has no ongoing relationship or who may not be willing to be named. 30 A journalist may have good reason to be convinced that the source's information is accurate but cannot prove it years later in court, especially if the information came from a confidential source.
Second, the defence of qualified privilege has tended to be denied to journalists. Qualified privilege protects speech where there is an obligation to communicate it and a corresponding duty to receive it. The privilege is lost if communication is broader than to those to whom there was a duty to convey it. Courts tended to hold that there is no duty on journalists to communicate to the "world at large," even on matters of broad public interest, 31 In Grant, in 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada created a new responsible communication defence modeled on the United Kingdom's Reynolds defence. It has two elements: the publication must be on a matter of public interest and publication must have been responsible in the circumstances. 34 The public interest element uses the same definition of public interest that is found in the defence of fair comment. Public interest refers to matters "inviting public attention, or about which the public has some substantial concern because it affects the welfare of citizens." 35 As Eric Descheemaeker notes (in relation to the Reynolds defence), "public interest" is a category that has been around for years and Reynolds does not change its meaning. 36 The same is true of Grant. The second element relates to whether the defendant acted responsibly in publishing, given the steps that were taken to verify any allegations. The shown traditionally have been narrow and have mainly allowed the media to reproduce official documentation rather than to encourage investigative reporting in the interests of free speech. The court in Shavluk found there was a qualified privilege in relation to a press release on a matter of public interest. (e) whether the plaintiff's side of the story was sought and accurately reported; (f) whether the inclusion of the defamatory statement was justifiable; (g) whether the defamatory statement's public interest lay in the fact that it was made rather than its truth ("reportage"); and (h) any other relevant circumstances.
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Grant therefore created a standalone fault-based defence. (The Court dismissed the idea that responsible communication would be a form of qualified privilege, as it initially was in the United Kingdom.) 38 Like Reynolds, Grant was hailed as a boon for freedom of expression, especially for journalists. 39 It was explicitly meant to shift the balance of defamation law toward greater freedom of expression. 40 And although the defence was said to apply to "anyone," it was clear that like the Reynolds defence, the Grant defence was especially valuable to journalists.
An additional law to protect public interest speech was enacted in Ontario in 2015. The Protection of Public Participation Act allows certain claims, essentially strategic lawsuits against public participation, or "SLAPPs," 41 42 and British Columbia briefly had an anti-SLAPP law, but it was repealed. 43 Now, however, other than Quebec, Ontario is the only province that has an anti-SLAPP law. (Although Canada has ten provinces and three territories, 39% of Canadians live in Ontario.) 44 The law reflects the recommendations of the Attorney General of Ontario's Advisory Committee on SLAPPs. 45 In particular, legislators rejected an approach grounded in the plaintiff's intent (which was taken in the short-lived British Columbia anti-SLAPP law) in favour of one grounded in whether the speech is on a matter of public interest.
The PPPA amends the Courts of Justice Act to include the following: (ii) the moving party has no valid defence in the proceeding; and (b) the harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party's expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression.
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To summarize, the PPPA provides for proceedings to be dismissed where they involve expression on matters of public interest, there are no grounds to believe the case has merit, including no defences, and the harm to the responding party is serious enough to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression by dismissing the proceeding. The onus of proving that the matter involves expression on a matter of public interest falls on the moving party (i.e., the defendant), while the onus of proving that there are no grounds to believe the case has merit and that the harm to the responding party outweighs the public interest in protecting speech falls on the responding party (i.e., the plaintiff). The underlying action need not be a defamation action, so long as it involves a threat to expression on a matter of public interest.
Given that the responsible communication defence and PPPA are quite new, I examine how they are being applied to date and whether they seem to be achieving their aims.
III. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THESE NEW MECHANISMS AT ACHIEVING THEIR AIMS?
A. Responsible Communication
In the eight years since Grant, there have been 34 47 determinations on the merits as to whether the responsible communication defence applies. It was made out in only 7/34 (21%) and failed in 27/34 (79%).
48 This is 46 . Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c C.43 (Can. Ont.). 47. Because the article is number-heavy, I have dispensed with the usual rules requiring certain numbers to be spelled out while using numerals for others. I use numerals for numbers related to analyzing the case law unless at the beginning of a sentence.
48. I identified all the responsible communication cases reported in CanLII, Westlaw and Quicklaw between the time Grant was decided and Nov. 1, 2017. I then excluded those for which there was no determination on the responsible communication issue (e.g. interlocutory decisions). broadly consistent with low success rates noted in England. At the time of Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe (Jameel), Andrew Scott noted that the defence succeeded in only 3/20 cases. 49 Twenty-one percent is a low success rate for responsible communication considering that, according to a larger empirical study of Canadian defamation actions, defendants succeeded 72% of the time between 2003-2013. 50 Thus, the low success rate in arguing responsible communication cannot be attributed to low defendant success rates generally. Instead, defendants are succeeding by arguing defences such as qualified privilege, as well as arguing that pleadings are insufficient, etc.
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(That said, the rate of success in arguing responsible communication does not take into account the fact that a defendant may still have avoided liability through another defence. A direct comparison to defendant success rates overall is therefore misleading.)
Mounting a responsible communication defence can be expensive, since each of the listed indicia of responsible communication is generally addressed, adding considerable complexity to a case. 52 This, combined with the low success rate, could deter defendants from pleading it, thereby minimizing its utility. The low success rate and high cost could even chill speech, particularly in newsrooms where lawyers are often involved in decisions whether and how to publish.
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There were 34 cases. Since these figures are based only on decisions reported in these online databases, unreported decisions are not included. Jury decisions in particular are less likely to be reported, so some caution is warranted in assessing these figures. That said, the reported cases represent the common law of defamation. They are the cases that judges will rely on in applying the defence to future cases. Although there is no reason to think that the actual cost is the same in Canada, in both countries the responsible communication defence is similar and complex, adding significant expense to litigation.
53. The extent to which lawyers are involved in publishing decisions in Canadian newsrooms is unclear, but there is anecdotal evidence of this in Canada and other jurisdictions. In his book on the Jian Ghomeshi scandal, reporter Kevin Donovan writes about consulting with a lawyer before deciding to publish the story. KEVIN DONOVAN, SECRET LIFE: THE JIAN Now consider how the success rates break down. Traditional media had greater success with the defence. 5/7 cases (71%) in which the defence succeeded involved traditional media. Where the defence failed, only 7/27 cases (26%) involved traditional journalists. This may suggest that the defence works reasonably well for journalists but not for non-journalists. Viewed in terms of how often journalists succeed with the defence, however, the numbers are less promising. The defence was applied to 13 traditional journalism communications. 54 It succeeded in 5/13 (38%). Recall that the overall success rate for defendants is 72%, so 38% does not seem high.
It is unsurprising that journalism fared better than non-journalism in responsible communication assessments given the existence of professional standards of conduct for journalists. Another reason, however, is uncertainty regarding the scope of the defence. It is unclear whether responsible communication only applies to journalism (broadly defined) or applies to all kinds of communications. 55 On the one hand, citing 55. Another way of framing the question is whether it only applies to those who publish to the world at large. The "world at large" issue comes from the qualified privilege defence, where it was often held that the media had no duty to publish to the world at large and the citizenry had no corresponding interest in receiving such communications. As a result, qualified privilege did not apply. On the other hand, the Supreme Court used journalistic criteria to assess whether communication was responsible. For example, one criterion relates to whether the subject was given an opportunity to comment on the statement before publication. 59 The Court used almost exclusively journalistic examples and gave as a reason in support of the new defence that journalists tend not to be able to avail themselves of qualified privilege. 60 Some courts have therefore interpreted Grant's reference to "anyone," and its insistence that this is not just a journalism defence to mean that the defence also applies to new forms of citizen journalism such as blogging, which is explicitly mentioned in Grant, or to communications to the world at large, but not literally to all communications. Examples of this interpretation include Foulidis v. Baker:
[70] In my view, there are several related reasons why [responsible communication] is not available to the defendant. This case does not involve either traditional media or new media dissemination of information. It involves communication which is almost antiquated in nature: a letter, delivered by hand. The letter was not published generally, as is the case with media publication, but to a select and focused few. Further, in a case of widespread media publication, the defence of qualified privilege is often unavailable. . . . In my view, it adds unnecessary complexity to this area of the law to hold that this important new defence is available to a non-media defendant to whom the defence of qualified privilege has been found to apply.
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The same reasoning was applied in rejecting the defence in Bernstein v. Poon: "While I would not definitively rule that the defence of responsible communication is the exclusive preserve of so-called 'public communicators,' it is clear that the defence can most readily be associated with communications relating to matters of public importance where the timeliness of the communication is a factor." 62 In denying the availability The scope of the defence was not discussed. There are other cases in which responsible communication was applied to non-journalistic communications and, although it did not succeed, this was not because the kind of communication fell outside the scope of the defence. 65 That said, when the scope of the defence is actually discussed, the cases all conclude that it is limited to journalism, citizen-journalism, or to publications to the world at large.
I have discussed elsewhere the issue of whether responsible communication applies to non-journalism, or to publications that are not to the world at large, 66 concluding that the defence applies to all kinds of communications. For present purposes, it is enough to note that courts tend to interpret the scope of the defence narrowly.
Even when courts are willing to apply responsible communication to non-journalistic publications, they tend to rigidly apply the journalistic criteria from Grant in assessing whether publication was responsible in the circumstances. This is despite the Supreme Court warning against a "checklist" approach, noting that this was a problem with the Reynolds version of the defence. Rather, Grant stated that the indicia are merely illustrative. It is difficult to state how often an inappropriate checklist approach is taken to the responsible communication defence because the application of each of the criteria to the facts is not necessarily inappropriate. What is usually meant by a "checklist" approach is that all the listed criteria are considered and, generally, failure to satisfy one means that the defence fails. Applying most or all of the criteria without considering their relevance to communicating responsibly in a particular case is also a kind of checklist approach. That is, the criteria are assumed to be relevant, and are discussed without stating the relevance of the criterion to communicating responsibly in the circumstances.
The clearest examples relate to the application of the "whether the plaintiff's side of the story was sought and accurately reported" criterion. It has often been said to be especially important to whether communication is responsible. 68 Failing to seek and report on the plaintiff's side of the story can be fatal to the defence. For example, in Taseko Mines Limited v. Western Canada Wilderness Committee (Taseko), the court stated that: "The defence of responsible communication would not apply. Taseko's side of the story was not reported by the Wilderness Committee or Mr. Biggs." 69 The implication is that this criterion is determinative. 70 Yet there are circumstances, within and outside traditional journalism, in which it is not irresponsible not to seek or report the plaintiff's side of the story. 68. "It has been said that this is 'perhaps the core Reynolds factor' (Gatley, at p. 535) because it speaks to the essential sense of fairness the defence is intended to promote, as well as thoroughness. In most cases, it is inherently unfair to publish defamatory allegations of fact without giving the target an opportunity to respond: see, e.g., Galloway v. Telegraph Group Ltd., Given the overtly partisan nature of the publication in Taseko (promoting the environment and environmentalism), it is not obvious that an environmental activist group only publishes responsibly where it seeks and publishes the views of a mine that the group is critical of. Unlike traditional journalists, the activists are not and should not be expected to be neutral.
Another example of applying the criteria as a checklist is found in Kazakoff v. Taft (Kazakoff). 72 It involved a dispute about a deer cull. The plaintiff had received a conditional discharge on a criminal charge related to tampering with deer traps. The defendant was the mayor of a town who posted the following about the plaintiff in the reader comments section of an online media site:
. . . I wouldn't be so quick to believe convicted felons who have extreme positions on animal rights issues and who do not respect the decisions of democratically elected local governments doing what the majority of their constituents want . . .
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The court assessed the responsible communication defence and found it was not made out. In its analysis the court listed the criteria of responsible communication from Grant, stated that the list was not exhaustive, then reasoned as follows:
Each of these factors weighs against the defence of responsible communication in this case. Describing the plaintiff as a "convicted felon" was a serious allegation. There was no public importance in doing so. There was certainly no urgency regarding the communication. Rather it was a "knee-jerk" reaction after the defendant "skimmed" the e-know post. The source of the information relied upon by the defendant was his "vague recollection" of what had occurred during the plaintiff's court preceding which turned out to be wrong. The plaintiff's side of the story was not sought. I have found that there was no justification for the rule that in all circumstances the information must be verified and the other side's version of events sought. In an earlier proceeding involving Nazerali and Mitchell, the British Columbia Supreme Court stated: "A failure to seek the 'other side of the story' from the proposed subject of a publication in advance may be a relevant factor, but is not one that in itself always precludes the availability of the defence." Nazerali, 2016 BCSC para. 25. "Failure to report the plaintiff's explanation is a factor to be taken into account. Depending upon the circumstances, it may be a weighty factor. But it should not be elevated into a rigid rule of law." Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1999 It is not clear, however, why many of these things are relevant to whether the defendant communicated responsibly. The Grant urgency criterion relates to journalism being a perishable commodity and recognizes that there is a cost to delaying publication in order to continue to verify allegations. 75 None of this is relevant to an individual commenting on a media site. It could be argued that there was urgency in that comments will not be read if published long after the article itself has been published, but the fact remains that waiting would not have resulted in the defendant doing more verification. This is not journalism. As the court noted, it was a "knee-jerk" reaction.
Second, the source of the information is likely relevant to responsibleness here (the defendant formed his own view of the facts without recourse to an external source), but not in the same way it is when journalism is involved. Journalists are meant to be even-handed and accurate, and they must therefore try to ensure that the sources they rely on are reliable and unbiased. There is arguably no similar expectation that citizens commenting on news stories will ensure their sources are reliable before publishing.
The same is true of the criterion regarding seeking and reporting on the plaintiff's version of events. This is just not something that non-journalists do very often, nor should they be expected to in order to contribute to debate on matters of public interest. The role of citizens and journalists is fundamentally different in this respect.
None of this is to suggest that the defendant published responsibly in Kazakoff. The point is that the court considered largely irrelevant criteria in assessing whether communication was, in fact, responsible. It viewed the criteria as a checklist. ONSC 1, para. 44 (Can.), in which the court held that the statements (newspaper ads alleging criminality on the part of the plaintiff, the defendant's former lawyer) were not communicated responsibly in part because the plaintiff's side of the story was not sought. It is odd to imagine what could have been gained by seeking the plaintiff's side of the story. The plaintiff could have clarified that the statements were inaccurate, but the defendant was a former client with a grudge, not a reporter seeking a balanced account of reality. In theory, the defendant might have chosen not to publish, but the point is that it is odd to apply journalistic criteria to non-journalistic publications in determining whether they were communicated responsibly.
Some courts apply the Grant criteria in a more nuanced way than in the examples above. 77 Nevertheless, an inappropriate checklist approach is sometimes taken, to the defendant's disadvantage.
To date, it appears that responsible communication, although a welcome development in Canadian law, is not the game-changer it was predicted to be. Its application to non-journalists is unclear, despite the Supreme Court suggesting that the defence applies to all communications on matters of public interest. In addition, the way courts determine whether a communication is reasonable is grounded in journalistic criteria, which some courts apply rigidly.
Although this symposium is primarily concerned with threats to journalistic publications on matters of public interest, it is also important to protect public interest speech by non-journalists. It is therefore problematic that communications on matters of public interest are not being protected solely because they are not journalistic, or because they do not comply with journalistic practices but might otherwise be responsible in the circumstances, when this is contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Grant. Even where publications are journalistic the defence rarely succeeds. And assuming the English experience is mirrored in Canada, it is expensive and time consuming to argue.
What we cannot tell from the cases, however, is whether the law is affecting the chilling effect on speech. It may be that the defence gives people, especially journalists, the confidence to publish controversial facts on matters of public interest in the first place. This is because the existence of the defence may make such publications less likely to be the subject of litigation at all. Qualitative studies in the United Kingdom and Australia . . . Mr. Janke took no steps to solicit Mr. Wilson's side of the story before publishing the letter. It bears repetition that the Court recognized in Grant that this "core factor" is particularly crucial in the due diligence analysis since it speaks to the essential sense of fairness the defence is intended to promote. That proposition has resonance here since Mr. Wilson did have information that could have illuminated or resolved a number of the apparent inconsistencies in his campaign return. . . . I have some sympathy for the position that Mr. Janke assumed from the blanket denials in the press that Mr. Wilson was unlikely to have anything to say to him. Nevertheless, he did not make any effort to confirm that was the case. While I accept that a blogger operates under resource limitations the mainstream press do not, Mr. Janke could have taken steps to email or otherwise contact Mr. Wilson without ever leaving his desk.
The court applied the "seeking the plaintiff's side" criterion as one of a number of factors in concluding that the publication was not reasonable. It noted the importance of getting the plaintiff's side but did not suggest it was always required. It was relevant to the facts of this case because the blogger was purporting to be objective, was trying to state facts accurately, was wrong about some facts, and could have clarified the matter by contacting the plaintiff.
suggest their equivalent defences have at least some effect. 78 More study is needed in Canada although there is some evidence that Canadian journalists are taking comfort from responsible communication and are crafting their publications with the defence in mind.
79 For non-journalists or journalists without the benefit of considerable legal advice, the effect of responsible communication on publication decisions is likely to be minimal.
B. PPPA
The PPPA is less than three years old and no appellate level cases have yet been decided. (As this article goes to press, a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in six PPPA cases is expected but has not yet been released.) Nevertheless, it is possible to make some initial observations about how the law is being applied from the 20 cases decided to date.
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Recall that the law creates a presumption in favour of dismissal whenever a claim is based on expression on a matter of public interest. 81 In order to displace the presumption, the responding party must show that there are grounds to believe that the case has substantial merit and that the harm to 78. In the UK, for example, there is evidence that traditional media will not always feel able to publish everything. Weaver et al., supra note 34, at 1285. ("But the English media frankly admitted that defamation laws had a significant effect on their coverage."). As to whether them in dismissing the claim outweighs the harm to freedom of expression in allowing it to proceed.
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To assess whether the law is achieving its aims, consider the purposes section of the PPPA:
(a) to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest;
(b) to promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest; (c) to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest; and (d) to reduce the risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action. 83 The PPPA has been described as "very defendant friendly." For our purposes, the question is whether the law seems to be achieving its stated aims of combatting or preventing suits that inappropriately deter or punish expression on matters of public interest. This, in turn, depends on which parties are availing themselves of the mechanism, under which circumstances, how long the cases are taking to be heard, and how courts interpret the legislation.
Success Rates on the Motion to Dismiss
Of the 20 cases decided to date, the motion succeeded and the claim was dismissed in 10 (50%), while the motion failed in 10 (50%). The first 3 motions (in terms of decision date) were denied, and commentators have noted that the PPPA was interpreted quite restrictively in the first few cases. 84 PPPA motions began to be interpreted in a more defendant-friendly way. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare these figures to rates for other anti-SLAPP provisions or to summary judgment motions or other similar proceedings because these statistics do not exist -at least not for Canadian actions. The figures should nevertheless be relevant to assessing whether the PPPA provision is meeting its goals and they also provide a benchmark for future study.
Nature of the Underlying Claim
Most of the motions involved underlying claims of defamation, either solely or in addition to another cause of action (17/20 = 85%), with 14 (70%) being defamation only. The other causes of action raised in these cases were breach of contract, intentional infliction of nervous shock, intrusion upon seclusion, malicious prosecution, breach of confidence and unjust enrichment.
14/19 categorizable cases 88 (74%) involved new media communications (email and internet), either solely or in addition to offline publication. 7 of those involved social media. 7 of those (37%) involved social media; 26% of PPPA cases to date involve communications on Facebook (5/19) and 21% involved Twitter (4/19) (2 cases involved both). One concerned comments on an online news story, another related to a blog, others to online news stories themselves. Two further cases were about emails. So while there are PPPA cases involving a wide range of expression (pamphlets handed out at a parade, a report, a print magazine, email), new media communications figure prominently. There are too few cases to determine whether PPPA motions in respect of new media expression are more or less likely to succeed.
3. The Parties 10/19 categorizable cases (53%) had at least one corporate plaintiff. 6/19 (32%) had at least one corporate defendant. One of these was a not- for-profit community group. 89 To the extent that SLAPPs are often thought of as being brought by more powerful parties to silence weaker ones, this division makes sense. Corporations are often more powerful than individuals and they are well represented among the plaintiffs. That said, a power differential is not required under the PPPA and nor are corporations the only powerful entities. 90 For example, in two cases the plaintiffs were city councillors. 91 In only three of the reported anti-SLAPP cases were a traditional journalist or journalism organization the moving party. Several other cases involved journalism, but the parties involved were not journalists. For example, Hughes v. Truyens (unreported) involved comments on a small newspaper's website but the site itself was not sued, nor was its parent company, Postmedia. 92 Similarly, Thompson v. Cohodes concerned comments the defendant made in an interview with the Business News Network, but the plaintiff sued the interviewee, not the interviewer. 93 In Niagara Peninsula Conservation Authority v. Smith, 94 the defamatory words were found in a report, and the report's author was sued. Although Postmedia published an article about the report, it was not sued. In Accruent v. Mishimagi (Accruent), the relevant publication was a press release, but the defendant was a former employee, not a journalist. 95 Only in Bondfield Construction v. The Globe and Mail (Bondfield), 96 
Montour v. Beacon Publishing
97 (Montour), and Armstrong v. Corus (Armstrong) were anti-SLAPP motions brought by a media organization or journalist. In Montour, a small Ottawa-based magazine publisher was sued in relation to an article in Frontline Safety & Security Magazine. The motion to dismiss failed. In Armstrong, a city councillor sued other politicians and a radio station for airing commentary about the councillor's criminal conviction for sexual assault. 98 This motion to dismiss also failed. In Bondfield, Canada's leading newspaper was sued. The motion to dismiss succeeded, although the judge seemed reluctant to dismiss.
Although we do not know what percentage of defamation actions is brought against journalists generally, there is some reason to think it is in the same ballpark as 16% (3/19). 99 I had hypothesized that there would be relatively few PPPA motions by journalists. I had assumed plaintiffs would be less likely to target media companies with SLAPP suits because such companies are less likely to be intimidated and less likely to lack the resources to defend themselves. (This may be true of the Globe and Mail, but perhaps not of smaller media companies.) In addition, I reasoned that media companies are less likely than non-journalists to defame in the first place, given their professional responsibilities. On the other hand, given the PPPA's focus on expression on matters of public interest, it is perhaps not surprising that journalism is well-represented among the PPPA motions to dismiss. Whether they defame less or not, empirical research shows that there are now fewer defamation actions brought in relation to journalism than non-journalism. 
Costs
The PPPA contains statutory presumptions with regard to costs. Section 137.1(7) of the CJA creates a presumption that the moving party (defendant) receives full indemnity costs if successful on the motion. Section 137.1(8) creates a presumption that the responding party (plaintiff) does not receive costs even if successful on the motion. 101 Both sections, however, allow for judicial discretion to depart from the presumption when "appropriate in the circumstances." In 10 cases, there was a reported decision on costs. Of these, the motion failed in 3 and succeeded in 7. In each of the 3 unsuccessful motions, there were no costs awards against the unsuccessful defendant. In each of the 7 cases in which the motion was successful and the proceeding was dismissed, costs were awarded to the successful defendant on a full indemnity basis. 102 In other words, courts are adhering to the statutory presumptions, notwithstanding their discretion to depart from them.
Statutory Interpretation: Public Interest
For the purposes of the PPPA, "public interest," means the same thing as it means in other defamation contexts, such as fair comment and responsible communication. 103 For example, in Levant v. Day (Levant) the court stated that in interpreting "public interest" for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP provisions, courts have turned to the definition in Grant (in the context of responsible communication):
[105] To be of public interest, the subject matter "must be shown to be one of inviting public attention, or about which the public has some substantial concern because it affects the welfare of citizens, or one to which considerable public notoriety or controversy has attached", . . . Public interest may be a function of the prominence of the person referred to in the communication, but mere curiosity or prurient interest is not enough. Some segment of the public must have a genuine stake in knowing about the matter published.
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"Public interest" is a broad category. It is clearly not limited to government matters. The Ontario legislature must have intended for the PPPA to apply broadly and this is part of what makes it so defendantfriendly.
Although courts have tended to apply the broad interpretation of public interest to the PPPA, there are exceptions. In Levant, the court cited the above definition but went on to find that where a statement amounts to "a defamatory personal attack thinly veiled as a discussion on matters of public interest" it does not satisfy the public interest requirement of the anti-SLAPP provisions. 105 The allegedly defamatory statement in that case was an accusation that prominent lawyer and media figure, Ezra Levant, was profiting from donations his media organization was collecting for forest fire relief by benefitting from the charitable donations tax deduction. Regardless of Mr. Day's motives for making the allegations, they plainly involve a matter of public interest, as that concept has long been understood. The court in Levant seems to have misapplied a statement in Able Translations, where the court noted that where a matter was not, in pith and substance, one of public interest but rather a thinly veiled attack, courts could deal with it as such. But in that case the communication in question was found to be on a matter of public interest. 106 Misapplications of a "public interest" test are not unique to the PPPA, 107 but this particular approach whereby personal attacks negate public interest does appear to be unique to this legislation. To date, only Levant appears to apply it. However, in Accruent, the court seems also to have misinterpreted the public interest test. Although the only reported decision is on costs, and it does not set out the facts in detail, the expression in question seems to have been criticism of ongoing court proceedings, 108 which is plainly expression on a matter of public interest. Yet the court held there was no public interest in the expression in that case.
Further, at least one judge has expressed some sympathy for the argument that the test of public interest should be narrower in the anti-SLAPP context than in the responsible communication context.
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He correctly applied the law of public interest, but the consequences under the PPPA of a communication being on a matter of public interest (namely, that there is then a presumption that the case will be dismissed) may make it more likely that courts interpret public interest narrowly.
Statutory Interpretation: Grounds to Believe the Proceeding has Merit & there are No Valid Defences
Under subsection 137.1(4) of the Act, a proceeding on a matter of public interest will not be dismissed if there are "grounds to believe" the were two days of oral argument.) 119 If this trend continues, which he thought it would, he saw no reason not to require parties to put their best foot forward, as with summary judgment motions. 120 Three of the most recent cases have followed Fitzpatrick J and applied the balance of probabilities rather than "reasonable grounds to believe". 121 This is an issue likely to be addressed by the Ontario Court of Appeal.
Whether the standard is reasonable grounds to believe or a balance of probabilities, it is still sometimes unclear what evidence is required to meet that standard. For example, in United Soils v. Mohammed (United Soils), the court discussed in obiter whether the moving party had to have independent evidence to support her defences. It said that requiring such evidence "is to undermine the intention and policy behind the legislative changes that are the basis for this motion," 122 because it would require Mohammed to expend significant resources. Thus, "compelling and credible evidence" does not require defendants to provide independent evidence of their defences. Given that the onus is on the plaintiff, this seems sensible. In 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association et al. (Pointes Protection), the court had held that the defendant had to have at least filed a statement of defence in order for the plaintiff to show there 119. Id. para. 117. 120. "I expect that the extended timeline and process for these s. 137.1 motions will become more the norm than the exception given that the outcome could be the end of the litigation similar to summary judgments. If so, then I suggest that the standard civil burden of the balance of probabilities, or something approaching that standard, should apply." Id. para 59. Later, at para. 82, Fitzpatrick J. states, "[f]or the reasons set out above, if I am correct that these motions will evolve such that the timeline and process rivals those for summary judgments then I suggest that the balance of probabilities, or something approaching that standard, should apply for this burden of proof on the plaintiff also . . . In my view, the balance of probabilities is the appropriate and obvious threshold."
121. McLaughlin v. Maynard, 2017 ONSC 6820, para. 15 (Can. Ont.) ("Most judges have followed Mr. Justice Dunphy's conclusion in that case that the burden of proof . . . should be between the accepted civil standard and the 'frivolous and vexatious' test applied to the striking of pleadings. In the recent decision of Rizvee v was no viable defence, 123 but given that the court's "low threshold" was abandoned by subsequent courts, this is likely not good law in 2018. The last hurdle for plaintiffs is to show that the harm to them from the expression outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression, per s. 137.1(4)(b). This section of the CJA does not use the "grounds to believe" language used in s. 137.1(4)(a), but Justice Dunphy interpreted the burden as being the same: "reasonable grounds to believe." He considered that the legislature could not have intended to require the plaintiff to prove injury on a balance of probabilities given the "summary nature of the proceeding," but that "a 'low threshold' is clearly not the appropriate test either." 125 Thus, there must be "credible and compelling evidence of harm that appears reasonably likely to be proved at trial." 126 Further, the court should consider "practical limitations" on available evidence due to the fact that this is a "fast-track summary proceeding."
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The first step in the analysis, not surprisingly, is to identify the relevant harms and their severity. 128 The harm from expression (usually harm to reputation) has sometimes been assessed by focusing on pecuniary losses. However, it now seems clear that for defamation, where special damages are rare and general damages are presumed from liability, factors relevant to the assessment of general damages should be considered. 129 These are set out in Hill v. Church of Scientology and include the conduct of the parties, the nature and extent of publication, the nature and composition of the audience, and whether there was an apology or retraction. Justice Dunphy also suggests that one should consider the public interest in giving people an opportunity to vindicate their reputations, even where the harm is minimal. 131 In terms of the public interest in protecting expression, the courts have, of course, acknowledged the importance of freedom of expression on matters of public interest. 132 Then courts tend to consider the public interest in the particular kind of expression at issue. According to one judge, the public interest in particular expression itself should not be dissected. Rather, the degree to which the expression "cleaves" or "strays" from the relevant matter of public interest should be assessed. 133 For example, in Platnick the expression was framed as "information intended to improve the administration of justice," "finding the correct balance between victims' rights and the public . . . in the accident compensation system" and "the role of experts in the system". 134 Each of these was said to be in the public interest and each was said to be "strongly engaged" by the expression in question. 135 In another case, the court cited the fact that the allegations related to matters that allegedly happened more than a decade ago in finding a lower public importance in protecting the expression. 136 Courts will also consider any evidence of a chilling effect on expression, 137 and any malice. Dunphy J. thought there was minimal public interest in protecting "expression born of malice."
138 Caution is warranted here. Malice will likely already have been considered at the defences stage. Further, it is not obvious that the harm from malicious speech is necessarily greater or that public interest in speech is necessarily diminished by malice. 139 Where the relevant values to be balanced are harm to reputation (or other harm from expression) and the public interest in protecting speech, the defendant's motives may or may not be relevant. Interestingly, in one case it was suggested that the plaintiff's motives should factor into the balancing. 140 In Rizvee, the court found that the defamation action was partly intended to warn and to chill speech. Intent to chill speech was not included in the PPPA, as it is in some anti-SLAPP legislation, because it is often difficult to prove. Nevertheless, where courts do find an intent to chill speech, that can be taken into account at the balancing stage. There is a public interest in not letting people get away with trying to chill speech. (In Bondfield, the judge did not consider intent at the balancing stage but instead indicated that he was reluctant to dismiss given that the case did not appear to involve intent to silence. Although the judge did ultimately dismiss, it is problematic to rely on a lack of intent to silence given that the legislature chose not to require intent to silence.) 141 To this point I have discussed what to balance, and on what standard evidence of that harm is required. As for how to balance, " [t] here is very little guidance in s. 137.1(4)(b) of the CJA as to how the weighing of the harm likely to have been suffered by the plaintiff is to be conducted relative to the public interest in allowing the claim to proceed and the public interest in protecting the expression." 142 Courts have held that balancing should take into account the PPPA's objectives. 143 Beyond that, there is little of a general nature that can be said. Reputational harm and public interest in freedom of expression are apples and oranges, especially since one primarily affects the plaintiff while the other affects many more people, though each of them less severely -often imperceptibly. That said, courts are often called on to apply such balancing tests.
Complexity of Proceedings
The PPPA includes mechanisms to try to ensure that these motions are quick and not unduly expensive to pursue, such as putting a hold on all considering malice at the balancing stage. I think it is going too far to say, as Dunphy J. did, that there is minimal public interest in protecting "expression born of malice." Platnick, 2016 ONSC para. 134. Consider, for example, a whistleblower who reveals important facts on a matter of public interest solely to claim a reward. That would be a malicious purpose, but the public interest in the information would be undiminished. If the information were true, there would be a justification defence, but this is nevertheless a counterexample to Judge Dunphy's proposition.
140. Rizvee v 145 and requiring the motion to be heard within 60 days. 146 If one of the problems of SLAPPs is that they deter people from speaking out because of the costs (financial and otherwise) of defending an action, then costly anti-SLAPP motions make it harder for the legislation to achieve its goals.
In reality, though, proceedings under the PPPA tend to be fairly complex. This is perhaps unsurprising given what's at stake. As noted above, Justice Fitzpatrick observed that anti-SLAPP motions tended to look like summary judgment motions: "Despite the intention of the legislation, I expect that the extended timeline and process for these s. 137.1 motions will become more the norm than the exception given that the outcome could be the end of the litigation similar to summary judgments." 147 As a result, counsel believe that they must effectively put their best foot forward on an anti-SLAPP motion. One referred to the motion as "summary judgmentlike."
148 Similarly, at a recent conference of Canadian media lawyers, no one could point to a case that had been heard within 60 days, as required by the legislation. 149 Rather, it often takes six months or more if for no other reason than that earlier court dates are not available. For example, in Papa v. Zeppieri the court adjourned a PPPA motion for eight months in part because it required two days to argue.
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Given the effect of dismissing a claim, it is understandable that judges want sufficient evidence and that parties will feel the need to put their best foot forward. But the more anti-SLAPP motions looks like summary judgment motions, the less utility they have, since summary judgment motions have always been available to SLAPP victims. (That said, the significant onus on the plaintiff on a PPPA motion still makes this preferable to summary judgment for many defendants.) To give effect to the legislation's intent, judges should try to come as close as possible to the 60-day limit and should not impose too high an evidentiary burden. 151 But it is not clear whether the 60-day limit is feasible or whether judges can be made to dismiss claims based on limited evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
At this early stage of PPPA litigation, there is reason for cautious optimism. Courts are generally applying the legislation in accordance with its purposes, despite the discomfort of some judges in dismissing claims. "On a fair review of the available decisions, the legislation has been interpreted consistent [sic] with the manner in which it was drafted. It was drafted as defendant friendly legislation, and it has been interpreted as such."
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Costs decisions and application of a broad public interest test are particularly in line with legislative intent. That said, there is reason for concern, especially in terms of the time and expense of PPPA motions. Not only is the 60-day limit not being met, but it is often not even close to being met. Another potential reason for concern is judges applying a lower threshold on the plaintiff than the PPPA suggests because of concerns about dismissing claims. This goes hand in hand with the complexity issue. The more evidence and argument on a PPPA motion, the more judges will be able to justify applying a summary judgment-like standard to PPPA motions.
Given the symposium theme it is also worth noting that journalists seem to be using the PPPA mechanism.
The Ontario Court of Appeal will soon rule in appeals of six of the twenty cases decided to date. The outcome will determine how the PPPA is to be interpreted going forward.
As for the responsible communication defence, appellate court guidance would be helpful on several fronts, but especially the application of the defence to non-journalists. In the meantime, however, both responsible communication and the PPPA are helping to shift the balance between protection of reputation and protection of free speech appropriately toward the latter.
